

scope of the assumed Soviet courses of action; ~~the-most-that-such~~
~~effeps-could-be-would-be-to-cause-some-nibbling-by-the-Social~~
~~Democrats-and-resultant-~~ however, an unequivocal Soviet offer to
unite Germany would find support among wide sections of the population
and would result in serious delay in pursuing rearmament.

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Austria

Note. The statements in this section assume that no Austrian Peace Treaty is signed and that Austria continues under anti-Communist governments headed by moderate parties, either the People's Party or the present coalition of the People's and Socialist Parties. Such a continuation is estimated as probable during the period of this estimate.

1. Basic Austrian attitudes will continue heavily pro-Western. However, the dominant Austrian belief will continue to be that Austria cannot abandon its position of non-participation in affirmative measures for Western defense and of aloofness from Western political warfare measures. The Austrians wish to avoid provoking the USSR so long as there is any hope of Soviet agreement to evacuate Austria.

2. There are likely to be increasing pressures for a greater degree of independence in Austrian policy, particularly on economic matters. Such pressures would tend to be greater to the extent that US economic aid tapered off, with resulting decline in US influence. Austrian support of East-West trade restrictions, while remaining firm in principle, might be substantially affected in practice, especially because of Austrian dependence on Polish and Czech coal. Austrian governments might

also seek, partly in response to political pressures, to pursue other independent moves along the lines of the recent approach to the UN via Brazil.

3. The Austrian Communist Party is currently weak, and all dominant groups in Austria are strongly anti-Communist and support anti-Communist measures by the government. Although Soviet pressures may continue to inhibit such measures as the outlawing of the party or the complete elimination of Communists from the Federal Police, the government is almost certain to take all possible measures to neutralize any appearances of Communist force.

4. The Soviet Bloc tactics that might affect Austrian attitudes most markedly would be in the field of economic inducements to trade with the Bloc. Because of the constant threat of unemployment in Austrian manufacturing industries, Austria is particularly vulnerable to offers to supply raw materials in return for Austrian finished products. Offers of food from the Bloc are also an attraction. While there is no substantial likelihood that Austrian trade could be so oriented to the Bloc as to affect its political orientation seriously within the period of this estimate, there might be a potentially significant increase in Austrian trade with the Bloc.

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Benelux Countries

1. There is unlikely to be any basic change in the pro-Western attitudes of these countries during the period of this estimate. On particular measures, ~~[it should be noted that]~~ they will be particularly influenced by positions taken by the UK.

2. No significant increase in Benelux defense efforts is to be expected, and the pace of rearmament may decrease. In Belgium the 24-month period of conscription is likely to continue a special target for attack unless a similar period is adopted by other NATO countries. The present government, with only a shaky majority, is unlikely to take a strong stand, and whichever party wins the (1953) elections is likely to bow to strong popular pressures for reducing the level of defense expenditures. The same is true in the Netherlands, where there is strong popular support for social welfare measures as an alleged first line of defense against Communism.

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3. Belgium is almost certain to continue the free supply of uranium from the Congo. On the matter of bases, the Benelux countries will almost certainly continue to support the NATO program, although there may be local frictions (particularly over the UK [air] base in Belgium). In general, all three Benelux countries are disposed to ratify the EDC treaty, although they

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may wish to wait until after the West Germans and French have acted. Opposition to any surrender of national sovereignty is marked in Belgium, which is influenced by its economic prosperity and relative self-sufficiency.

4. Belgium and the Netherlands are unlikely to withdraw their forces from Korea, and will probably continue to stand firm on the POW issue. They would probably be sensitive to US political warfare or other moves that appeared to increase East-West tension.

5. The Benelux countries are unlikely to increase their present limited support for East-West trade controls, and they, particularly the Netherlands, will almost certainly oppose any effective restrictions on the transit trade now conducted on a substantial scale through Antwerp and Rotterdam.

6. None of the Benelux countries has a serious internal Communist problem, and the governments would be likely to take effective measures against any Communist activities. The Netherlands government has made a serious effort to alert its people to the Communist threat and will probably continue to cooperate in such activities as broadcasting to Eastern Europe.

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7. All of the Benelux countries can probably be counted on generally to vote with the US in UN issues involving the East-West conflict directly. On colonial issues, the Belgians will continue to support the colonial powers, while the Dutch will tend to abstain, in part because of lasting resentment over the UN and US handling of the Indonesian question.

8. Both Belgium and the Netherlands are likely to continue trade agreements with the USSR, but are not likely to seek to negotiate on any other subjects. The only Soviet overtures to which they would be markedly subject would be offers of an apparently bona fide character for increased trade.

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Switzerland

1. Switzerland is almost certain to maintain strict political neutrality, but will continue to give limited cooperation to Western containment policies, notably in the economic field. Dominant Swiss sentiment is now clearly pro-Western and likely to remain so.

2. While Switzerland may increase her own defense efforts to a limited degree, it is unlikely that there will be any substantial direct cooperation with the US in the absence of increased evidences of Soviet belligerence. Interest in the Korean War, never great, has declined and is likely to remain slight. The Swiss are likely to remain particularly sensitive to US political warfare moves that appear to be of an aggressive nature.

3. The Swiss are likely to continue their limited support of East-West trade restrictions, but the extent of this support might be adversely affected by US restrictions on Swiss exports to the US, or by other evidences of a tightening of Western markets.

4. Internal Communist activity has declined substantially in Switzerland, and the government will almost certainly continue

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to take necessary measures to prevent its becoming a major factor.

5. If European integration makes progress during the period of this estimate, Swiss sentiment might become more favorable to participation in some form of Pan-European federation, at least for political and economic purposes. The Swiss are likely to remain apart from military cooperation measures in peacetime, but would probably agree to cooperation if hostilities appeared likely, in advance of any actual violation of Swiss frontiers.

Very Doubtful

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Whatever cooperation is envisaged would only be effective in case Swiss territory actually attacked.

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Scandinavia (including Iceland but excluding Finland)

1. There are unlikely to be any basic changes in the attitudes of Norway, Sweden, and Denmark ^{and Iceland} on the East-West conflict during the period of this estimate. ⁽⁴⁾ Regardless of the presence or absence of Soviet aggressive moves, Denmark, and Norway ^{and Iceland} have committed themselves to NATO too far to withdraw or substantially reduce their support for the West, while Sweden's more neutral position stems from causes unlikely to be seriously affected by the assumed Soviet courses of action.

2. In their defense efforts, both Norway and Denmark are unlikely to meet announced rearmament goals, and there would probably be strong popular resistance to increased sacrifices that would be required to achieve these goals. On the matter of bases, ^{Denmark & Norway} both countries will probably be prepared to agree ^{tactical air} eventually to construction of NATO bases that might be used in event of war, ^{and Denmark may even agree} but not, at least for the period of this estimate, to the permanent stationing of foreign forces at these bases, or otherwise. ^{also} Denmark will probably be prepared to grant additional facilities in ^{Iceland} of a defensive character, ^{Greenland, and Iceland may be prepared to do likewise.}

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3. Sweden is likely to continue its present defense effort, but is unlikely to deviate from its present policy against any overt cooperation with NATO.

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4. All three countries are likely to continue their present degree of support (i.e., non-military contributions) to the Korean War. They would be sensitive to measures that appeared likely to extend the conflict, but less so than the EDC group of countries. In other UN matters, all three countries will almost certainly continue to support the Western position on basic issues, although Sweden will continue to stress its formal neutrality.

5. On internal Communism, none of the three countries is likely to outlaw their Communist parties, which in any event are most unlikely to become formidable threats.

6. All three countries are likely to continue their fairly high degree of support for East-West trade restrictions, while insisting on limited trade for political and economic reasons. Swedish cooperation will remain informal but nonetheless fairly effective.

7. Although all three countries will ^{continue to} ~~almost certainly~~ negotiate with the USSR on trade possibilities, it is most unlikely that they would seek to negotiate bilaterally on any other important matters or that there would be any strong popular sentiment that favored a detente or believed one possible.

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4. All ^{four} ~~three~~ countries are likely to continue their present degree of support (i.e., non-military contributions) to the Korean War. They would be sensitive to measures that appeared likely to extend the conflict, [but less so than the EDC group of countries.] In other UN matters, all three countries will almost certainly continue to support the Western position on basic issues, although Sweden will continue to stress its formal neutrality. S

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6. ^(All four countries) All ~~three~~ countries are likely to continue their fairly high degree of support for East-West trade restrictions, ^(on strategic items) while insisting on limited trade for political and economic reasons. Swedish cooperation will remain informal but nonetheless fairly effective.

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Portugal

1. ⁽⁵⁾ Portugal is almost certain to remain ^{strongly} ~~violently~~ anti-Communist ideologically and pro-Western in its foreign policy attitudes. The Portuguese defense effort and degree of support for NATO are likely to continue at present levels. Portuguese cooperation will likewise continue on concrete matters of raw materials and bases, although Portuguese sentiment will continue to be sensitive to any appearance of infringement of Portuguese sovereignty.

2. On East-West trade restrictions, Portugal will continue to cooperate except with respect to Macao, where the Portuguese remain convinced that continued trade with Communist China is the only way to prevent Chinese Communist seizure of the port.

3. The Portuguese official and popular positions are unlikely to be affected by any likely Soviet Bloc tactic, although the Portuguese might enter into limited negotiations with the Chinese Communists on issues directly related to Macao. It should be noted, however, that Portuguese support for the West and NATO could be adversely affected by a breakdown in the US-Spanish negotiations, which would put Portugal in a difficult position strategically and politically.

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Spain

1. There is unlikely to be any basic change in Spanish official and popular attitudes, namely strong ideological anti-Communism, and, in practice, limited cooperation with Portugal and with the US, the latter on a quid pro quo basis. Spain will probably enter into base agreements with the US on the lines now worked out, and will continue to supply raw materials without significant difficulties. Although the Spanish defense effort is unlikely to increase, it will probably become more effective depending on the provision of US assistance.

2. Because of its strong anti-Communist sentiment, Spain, in contrast to other European countries (except for Portugal), would probably favor a more affirmative political warfare program by the US.

3. In North Africa, Spain is likely to continue overt and covert efforts to expand its influence and to assert a more friendly attitude to nationalist aspirations than the French. These activities may lead to increased friction with the French, which in turn would increase French opposition to any efforts to knit Spain more closely into European defense planning.

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1. Last sentence not very clear. Suggest something along the following lines. "Spanish defense effort is unlikely to increase insofar as Spanish budgetary allocations are concerned. The military effectiveness of the Spanish forces will increase to the extent that US assistance is provided."

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Ireland

1. Ireland will remain strongly anti-Communist ideologically, but is not likely to adhere to NATO or take any practical steps in support of the West, short of a state of war, unless given at least implied recognition of the abolition of partition.